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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

SWIFT V. STATE: WHEN A POLICE OFFICER BLOCKS A
PERSON'S PATH WITH A POLICE VEHICLE AND
PERFORMS A WARRANTS CHECK, AND A REASONABLE
PERSON WOULD BELIEVE THAT HE OR SHE IS NOT FREE
TO LEAVE THE POLICE PRESENCE, THERE IS A SEIZURE
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.

By: Kevin Cox
The Court of Appeals of Maryland found that a person is seized
under the Fourth Amendment if a reasonable person, based on the
totality of the circumstances, would believe that he or she is not free to
leave the police presence when a police officer blocks his or her path
with a police vehicle and performs a warrants check. Swift v. State,
393 Md. 139, 899 A.2d 867 (2006). Since the officer in this case did
not have a reasonable suspicion to support the seizure, the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated and the evidence obtained in
the seizure was ordered to be suppressed. [d. at 143, 899 A.2d at 869.
In the early morning hours of August 9,2003, Deputy Jason Dykes
("Dykes") was patrolling a high crime area, but had not received any
reports of criminal activity. Dykes observed Logan Swift ("Swift")
walking in the direction of oncoming traffic and continuously looking
over his shoulder towards Dykes. Dykes stopped his car in front of
Swift. While he did not activate his emergency equipment, he did
shine his headlights on Swift. Dykes asked Swift for permission to
talk with him and to obtain his identification. While conducting a
warrants check, Dykes was informed that Swift was known for
carrying weapons and drugs.
After learning of Swift's reputation, Dykes asked Swift if he could
search him. Swift did not reply verbally. He put his hands on the
hood of the police car, which Dykes viewed as consent. When Dykes
went to search Swift, Swift fled the scene but Dykes caught Swift and
arrested him. Swift was charged with possession of a handgun and
possession of cocaine.
Swift sought to suppress the cocaine seized during his arrest,
arguing that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, and
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that he was illegally seized. The Circuit Court for Wicomico County
denied Swift's motion to suppress and found him guilty of handgun
and drug violations.
Swift appealed the lower court's denial of his motion to suppress to
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted
Swift's petition for certiorari to determine whether an individual is
seized, for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, when a police
officer pulls his car directly in front of him, blocks his path, asks for
identification, and detains him while waiting for the results of a
warrants check.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland begins its analysis by reviewing
and applying principles of case law on the Fourth Amendment. Swift,
393 Md. at 149, 899 A.2d at 873. According to the Court, with regard
to the Fourth Amendment, there are three tiers of interaction between a
citizen and the police. Id. An arrest, the most intrusive encounter,
requires probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is
committing a crime. Id. at 150, 899 A.2d at 873 (citing Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983)). The second type of interaction,
commonly known as a Terry stop, is less intrusive because an officer
may only briefly detain an individual and the detention must be
supported by a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or
is about to commit a crime. Swift, 393 Md. at 150, 899 A.2d at 873.
The least intrusive police contact, and the category at issue in the
case at bar, is the consensual encounter. Id. at 151, 899 A.2d at 874.
A consensual encounter occurs when the police approach a person in
public, engage in conversation, request information, and the person is
free to answer or walk away. Id. A request for identification by a
police officer, by itself, does not make an encounter consensual. Id.
(citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984); Royer, 460 U.S. at
501).

The Court of Appeals of Maryland notes that a seizure does not
occur unless a police officer, by either physical force or show of
authority, restrains the person such that a reasonable person would not
feel free to terminate the encounter. Swift, 393 Md. at 151, 899 A.2d
at 874 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, n.16 (1968)). The Court goes
on to observe that the crucial test in deciding whether a seizure has
occurred is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances, the
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that
he or she was not free to leave. Swift, 393 Md. at 152-53, 899 A.2d at
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875 (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988)). The
Supreme Court has identified an example of such police conduct as the
operation of a car in an aggressive manner to block or control a
defendant's direction, speed, or movement. Swift, 393 Md. at 153, 899
A.2d at 875 (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575).
To determine whether the encounter between Swift and Dykes was
a consensual encounter or a seizure, the Court considered all of the
circumstances surrounding the encounter, and asked whether the
conduct of the police would have caused a reasonable person to
believe that she was not free to ignore the police presence and go
about her business. Swift, 393 Md. at 152-53, 899 A.2d at 875 (citing
Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569). The Court gives deference to the fact
that it was implied that Swift had to wait for the results of the warrants
check before he could leave. Swift, 393 Md. at 157, 899 A.2d at 877.
Combining all of the facts, it was reasonable for Swift to believe that
he was not free to go about his business. [d. at 156, 899 A.2d at 877.
Whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave police
presence greatly depends on the facts of the specific inquiry. [d. at
156, 899 A.2d at 876. In the instant case, Dykes made it clear by his
conduct, and in his testimony, that Swift was not free to leave because
Dykes stated that he was "not done with him." [d. The interaction
between Dykes and Swift was in the nature of a constructive restraint
rather than a consensual encounter. [d. The time of the encounter,
Dykes' conduct before he approached Swift, Dykes' blocking of
Swift's path with the police cruiser, shining his headlights on Swift,
his testimony that he was conducting an investigatory field stop, the
warrants check, and the fact that he never told Swift that he was free to
leave, taken together, led the Court to conclude that Swift was seized
under the Fourth Amendment and that the cocaine should have been
suppressed. [d. at 156-57, 899 A.2d at 877.
In Swift v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reaffirmed the
proposition that a seizure occurs if a reasonable person would feel
seized. Police officers in Maryland will now have to take this into
consideration when stopping citizens to ask for information. Defense
attorneys may also have a greater chance of having evidence
suppressed when obtained under facts similar to the case at bar. The
question will always be very fact specific. Simply asking for
identification, or executing a warrants check, may not necessarily
convert a consensual encounter into a seizure because such actions are
only circumstances to be considered in light of all of the other facts

2006]

Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment

91

surrounding an encounter. However, as in the facts of the instant case,
when a police officer stops a citizen in such a fashion that a reasonable
person would feel compelled to consent to a search, the officer has
seized the citizen under the Fourth Amendment.

